Abstract-This paper is concerned with a binary detection problem over a nonsecure network. To satisfy the communication constraint and against possible cyber attacks, which are modeled as jamming signals injected to the network, a likelihood ratio based (LRB) scheduler is designed in the sensor to smartly select informative sensor measurements for transmission. We show that even under a moderate transmission rate constraint of secure networks, an optimal LRB scheduler can achieve a comparable asymptotic detection performance to the standard Neyman-Pearson test using the full set of measurements, and is strictly better than the random scheduler. For nonsecure networks, the LRB scheduler can also maintain the detection functionality but suffers graceful performance degradation under different attack intensities. Finally, we perform simulations to validate our theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
C YBER-PHYSICAL Systems (CPS) are intelligent systems, which are typically networked systems for interactions between physical processes and computing components. Computation and communication capabilities are deeply embedded in CPS to help detect, monitor, and control physical entities in physical system remotely in a cooperative way. Examples of CPS include intelligent transportation systems, environmental monitoring networks, power distribution networks, healthcare monitoring systems, wireless sensor networks (WSNs), etc. These applications are generally safety-critical since system failures can result in disastrous breakdown to infrastructures' functionality and irreversible harm to human safety.
Distributed detection [1] in WSNs plays an important role in network monitoring. A typical distributed detection system consists of a decision center, a wireless communication link, and a group of sensor nodes. WSNs are usually deployed in public or adversarial environment over nonsecure channels [2] , under various potential cyber attacks, such as jamming [3] , selective Manuscript received October 14, 2016; revised January 11, 2017; accepted February 9, 2017. Date of publication February 16, 2017 ; date of current version September 17, 2018 . This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61273233 and Grant U1660202, and in part by the Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCNS.2017.2670326 forwarding [4] , message manipulation [5] , false data injection, [6] and routing attacks [7] . These attacks can induce deceptive false alarms in detection and lead to misjudging of the system state. For instance, an intruder may fabricate an equipment breakdown event in a process industry by sending deliberately forged signals to the detection center. Considerable economic loss will occur if the ongoing production process are terminated due to the nonexisting equipment breakdown. Previous security measures in WSNs (see, e.g., [8] - [11] ) are generally designed to against malicious attacks by preventing deceptive data sent or received by the sensors, controllers, and actuators. In practice, however, the defense mechanisms can often fail due to various unpredictable problems, such as human errors, design defects, incorrect operations, and device misconfigurations. This indicates that attacks may not be resolved even when defense technology is employed in the system. As Cardenas et al. pointed out in [12] , it is highly desirable that the system proceeds to function well or degrades gracefully even under attacks. Several recent works have considered the survivability issues for secure state estimation under cyber attack, see, e.g., [13] - [15] . They consider more intelligent and complex attack and defense schemes, and propose correction algorithms or detection methods in response to the possible attack. However, they do not quantify the level of performance degradation under attack, which is different from this work.
In this work, we consider a detection framework in Fig. 1 where the system and the remote tester are connected by a nonsecure network. In particular, a jamming attacker will possibly inject a signal q i into the channel. If the measurement y i is directly sent to the tester, the attacker renders it difficult for the tester to distinguish from the jamming signal. To solve it, we propose a communication scheduler in the transmitter whose state is denoted by γ i . For example, γ i = 0 corresponds to that y i is not transmitted to the tester while γ i = 1 indicates that y i is sent to the tester. The purpose of such a scheduler is twofold. First, the binary-valued γ i of the scheduler provides critical information for the tester to survive the ongoing jamming attack. Second, it helps to select "useful" measurements for transmission, and discard the "nonuseful" ones. From this perspective, the scheduler reduces the energy consumption for sensors as 2325-5870 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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only a subset of the sensor measurements will be transmitted to the tester. Observe that the likelihood ratio of sensor measurements is key to the celebrated Neyman-Pearson (N-P) test, which is known to be an optimal test for the binary hypothesis testing problem under a full set of measurements [16] . This suggests that the likelihood ratio might be a good candidate to quantify the importance of a sensor measurement. To pursue this idea, we propose a likelihood ratio based (LRB) communication scheduler for a binary hypothesis testing problem. Specifically, only the sensor measurement with its likelihood ratio far from one is useful for the detection decision and sent to the tester while the rest are deemed as nonuseful.
Scheduled transmission rate is introduced in [17] to quantify the reduction of communication cost by the scheduler, which is defined as the ratio of the number of transmitted measurements to the total number of sensor measurements in the average sense. Intuitively, the larger the scheduled transmitted rate, the larger the number of sensor measurements tends to be transmitted in a fixed time interval. Due to possible cyber attacks, a larger transmission rate does not always result in a better detection performance as it may also reduce the chance for the tester to discriminate the transmitted sensor measurements from the injected signals. We are therefore interested in the design of an optimal LRB scheduler to achieve a good detection performance under an appropriate transmission rate. Since the scheduler is a nonlinear function of sensor measurements, it is challenging to design an (asymptotically) optimal LRB scheduler for detection.
Under an LRB scheduler, which is to be specified later, we explicitly derive the rejection regions of the null hypothesis under optimal N-P tests. Due to nonlinearity of the scheduler, it is impossible to analytically calculate the probabilities of either Type I or II errors. Thus, we resort to the asymptotic approach to quantify the effect of the scheduler on the detection performance, and obtain optimal schedulers. Note that sensor data scheduling has been reported in [18] - [22] for detection problems and in [17] , [23] - [25] for state estimation problems, while none of these works consider security issues and the effect of sensor scheduling mechanism on the detection performance remains unexploited. In comparison, we conduct an asymptotic analysis as the number of sensor measurements tends to infinity. This enables us to clearly quantify how the scheduled transmission rate and the potential jamming data degrades the asymptotic detection performance. We remark that a fundamental point that differentiates this paper from its preliminary version [22] is the inclusion of secure detection framework and the related performance under cyber attacks.
The contribution of this work is summarized as follows. First, inspired by the feature of an N-P test, we propose an LRB communication scheduler to reduce the communication cost for a binary detection problem, which is shown to be efficient and simple both in theory and simulation. Second, under a scheduled transmission rate constraint, an asymptotically optimal LRB scheduler is designed to achieve the fastest exponential convergence of detection error. Third, using the scheduler information, we introduce test protocols to maintain detection functionality even when attack signals are injected in the channel. In addition, the degradation of detection performance under a certain attack intensity is explicitly quantified in the asymptotical sense.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the distributed detection problem and propose the LRB scheduler. In Section II-C, we explicitly develop the N-P test and conduct asymptotic performance analysis for the LRB scheduler. Section IV proposes a discriminate protocol at the tester for selecting sensor measurements when cyber attack happens. Asymptotic analysis are conducted to explicitly quantify the performance degradation of detection under different attack intensities. In Section V, simulation results are included to validate our theoretical results. In Section VI, we draw some concluding remarks and highlight some future research directions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Communication Scheduler for Secure Detection
Consider a scenario that a remote sensor is deployed to monitor a phenomenon of physical interest, which is modeled as a binary state of the nature. The sensor collects samples from the system and transmits them to a decision center through a nonsecure network. In this paper, the sensing signal is given by
where the system state is represented by a binary-valued θ ∈ {θ 0 , θ 1 } ⊂ R, and v i is a white Gaussian noise with variance σ 2 . Obviously, it does not lose generality by letting θ 0 < θ 1 . The task of the decision center is to discriminate between the two states using its received data. That is, a tester is implemented to solve the following hypothesis testing problem:
In statistics, H 0 is called the null hypothesis and H 1 is the alternative hypothesis. In contrast to the conventional hypothesis testing problem [16] , we focus on a distributed framework consisting of a communication scheduler, which is embedded in the sensor side, a remote tester and a nonsecure channel, see Fig. 1 for an illustration. In particular, let γ i = 1 indicate that the sensor is triggered to transmit y i to the tester at sampling time i and the packet containing the information of y i is perfectly delivered to the tester while γ i = 0 means that there is no data transmission between the sensor and the tester. That is, the scheduler will decide whether y i is to be transmitted or not. A natural question is how to design an efficient and easily implementable scheduler to achieve a good detection performance, even under the potential cyber attacks. In a secure network, the information received by the tester at time slot i is
If an attacker injects a jamming signal q i into a nonsecure channel, the tester at time i also receives q i . When γ i = 1, the tester is possibly unable to distinguish the two continuous-valued signals y i and q i . Then it cannot correctly identify the sensor measurement from y i and q i .
Given an arbitrary scheduler {γ i }, we adopt the so-called scheduled transmission rate [17] to roughly evaluate the average
where the mathematical expectation E θ [·] is taken with respect to the probability measure P θ . Intuitively, R θ characterizes the frequency of measurement transmission in the average sense. Obviously, a larger scheduled transmission rate corresponds to a higher ratio of the number of transmitted measurements to the total number of sensor measurements. Under the above detection framework, the objective of this work is as follows:
1) Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint, design an efficient and practical scheduler in the sense of achieving a good detection performance. 2) Design test protocols to maintain system functionality when jamming signals are injected into the system. 3) Exactly quantify the effect of the scheduler and different jamming attack intensities on the asymptotic detection performance.
B. LRB Scheduler
Given a full set of sensor measurements y = {y 1 , . . . , y N }, the rejection region for H 0 of the N-P test for a binary detection problem is expressed by
where f (y|θ j ) denotes the joint probability density function (pdf) of y with respect to θ ∈ {θ 0 , θ 1 } and k is a decision threshold. It is well known that the N-P test is a uniformly most powerful (UMP) test for the detection problem (2) under the full set of measurements y.
Since y i is a sequence of independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables, the rejection region in (4) can be explicitly expressed as y :
where
is the pdf of a Gaussian random variable with mean θ and variance σ 2 . As the rejection decision is mainly decided by the likelihood ratio, we resort to the likelihood ratio function to quantify the importance of a sensor measurement:
If g(y i |θ 0 , θ 1 ) is far from one, the measurement y i will lead to a significant change of the likelihood ratio, and eventually affects the tester's decision. Thus, we expect that y i associated with a likelihood ratio far from one may contain useful information for detection, and a measurement with its likelihood ratio close to one is regarded as less nonuseful or uninformative.
Taking advantage of the above observation and noting that y i is an i.i.d. random sequence, we propose a LRB scheduler of the following form:
1, otherwise ( where the scheduling parameter α > 1 and is to be designed. Informally speaking, the scheduler helps the sensor to decide whether a sensor measurement is useful or not. To reduce the number of sensor communication, only useful measurements will be transmitted to the tester and discard the rest of measurements.
To further simplify the LRB scheduler, let the parameters a and b satisfy that
It follows that
Notice that g(
, which is an increasing function in y. Thus, the LRB scheduler in (7) is explicitly rewritten as follows:
where a < b are two thresholds and a + b = θ 0 + θ 1 . See Fig. 2 for an illustration, which indicates that y i close to the center of θ 0 and θ 1 is not useful for the detection problem. This is consistent with our intuition as it is usually difficult to discriminate whether y i is sampled under H 0 or H 1 when y i is close to the center of θ 0 and θ 1 . From this point of view, it also corroborates the motivation of developing the LRB scheduler.
C. Random Scheduler
Consider a random scheduler for the detection problem by letting
, with a probability p, 0, with a probability 1 − p (11) and the scheduling sequence γ i is an i.i.d. process, which is independent of sensor measurements.
In comparison with the random scheduler, γ i of the LRB scheduler is a deterministic function of the sensor measurement y i . If y i is not transmitted by the sensor, the tester deduces that a < y i < b, which can also be utilized to improve the detection performance. Thus, it is expected that the LRB scheduler may achieve a better detection performance under the same scheduled transmission rate. We shall quantify it in the sequel.
III. CODESIGN OF THE LRB SCHEDULER AND N-P TEST
In this section, we focus on the LRB scheduler design under secure channels, i.e., the information received at the tester per time slot is z i = {γ i , γ i y i }, while the case under cyber attacks is discussed in Section IV.
A. N-P Test
We explicitly establish an N-P test under the scheduled communication in secure communication environment. To this end, define a rejection region of the null hypothesis for the N-P test as
It follows from N-P Lemma [16] that the above test is a UMP test. That is, if we restrict to the class of all level α tests (control the probability of Type I error as at most α), the N-P test would lead to the smallest probability of Type II error. Here Type I error (or error of the first kind) is the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis, and the probability of the Type I error is given by P θ 0 (R). Type II error (or error of the second kind) is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis, and its probability is denoted by P θ 1 (R c ).
1) N-P Test Under an LRB Scheduler:
Under the LRB scheduler (10), the information received by the tester at time N is written as z = {z 1 , . . . , z N }, whose pdf is given by
where p T (·) is the function of the truncated Gaussian pdf that lies within the set
, and is expressed as
where I U (y) is an indicator function, and ϕ(·) is the pdf of a standard Gaussian random variable, i.e.,
Then, H 0 is rejected if the following condition is satisfied:
where k ∈ R is to be designed to satisfy a given performance level. To simplify the notation, let
The probability of event {γ i = 0} is easily obtained as
By (13)- (15), we shall reject H 0 , if
where ln(·) is the natural logarithm function, and the second term in the last inequality becomes zero.
2) N-P Test Under a Random Scheduler:
The joint pdf of z = {z 1 , . . . , z N } with respect to θ under a random scheduler (11) is given by
Similarly, we shall reject H 0 in favor of H 1 if the following condition is satisfied:
Remark 1: In light of (16) and (18), it is interesting that the rejection conditions of both schedulers are of the same form. This means that there is no need for the tester to know which type of scheduler is used in the sensor node. Note that γ i in (16) is completely determined by y i , while it is independent of y in (18) . This will result in different detection performance.
For the LRB scheduler in (7), it may not be possible to explicitly calculate the probabilities of Type I and II errors under a given parameter k, although numerical algorithms can be used. However, both probabilities will decrease exponentially to zero as the number of sensor measurements tends to infinity. In the sequel, we shall quantify this decaying exponents.
B. Asymptotic Performance Analysis 1) Relative Entropy and Stein's Lemma:
By the Stein's lemma [26] that the best error exponent for the exponential convergence of the probability of Type II error is determined by the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence) from the null to alternative hypotheses, and is achievable by the N-P test.
Given two probability measures P 1 and P 0 over a set X , and P 0 is absolutely continuous with respect to P 1 , the relative entropy D from P 0 to P 1 is defined by
where dP 0 /dP 1 is the Radon-Nikodym derivative [27] of P 0 with respect to P 1 , provided that the expression on the right-hand side of (19) exists. In fact, D(P 0 ||P 1 ) characterizes the distance between two probability measures, which is key to decide the asymptotic detection performance.
. . , X n be an i.i.d. random sequence under the probability measure Q over a set X . Consider a binary hypothesis testing problem:
n be a rejection region of the null hypothesis H 0 . Let the probabilities of Type I and II errors be
, is the product measure [27] .
Lemma 1 quantifies the asymptotic performance of an optimal test. Specifically, if the probability of Type I error is controlled to be less than , the number of samples required to guarantee the probability of Type II error below a certain level δ < 1 is approximately given by
Note that N-P test is optimal in the sense of achieving the best decaying exponents, the relative entropy thus approximately evaluates the number of samples required for discriminating the null and alternative hypotheses. Hence it is sensible to maximize the relative entropy D(P 0 ||P 1 ) to achieve an asymptotically optimal hypothesis test.
2) Optimal LRB Scheduler: In view of (10), the relative entropy for the binary detection problem (2) is a function of scheduling parameters a and b. Thus, we rewrite D(P θ 0 P θ 1 ) under the scheduler (10) as
Definition 1: Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint, i.e., R θ R, an optimal LRB scheduler for the N-P test is solved via the following constrained optimization
Note that R θ is introduced in (3). Since y i is an i.i.d. random sequence, it follows that γ i is also i.i.d. This implies that
The following theorem provides an optimal LRB scheduler and quantifies its asymptotic detection performance.
Theorem 1: Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint, i.e., R θ R, the relative entropy from H 0 to H 1 under the LRB scheduler (10) is given by
where the scheduling thresholds a * and b * satisfy that
Proof: See Appendix A. The optimality of the proposed LRB scheduler looks similar to the interval-based scheduler proposed in [18] . However, they consider the optimality of an interval-based LRB scheduler over all event-driven schemes under the communication constraint with only respect to the null hypothesis, while here the scheduled transmission rate constraints should be satisfied under both the null and alternative hypotheses.
Remark 2: For the conventional detection problem using the full set of sensor measurements, which results in that R = 1, it follows from Theorem 1 that a * = b * . This implies that
In comparison, the second term in (25) quantifies the performance degradation due to the lack of the censored measurements.
3) Performance Comparison:
We evaluate the asymptotic performance of the optimal LRB scheduler, and compare with the random scheduler in (11).
Lemma 2: Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint, i.e., R θ R, the maximum relative entropy under the random scheduler in (11) is given by
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and, thus, omitted here due to page limitation. Next, we show that the LRB scheduler strictly improves the random scheduler.
Theorem 2: Under the same scheduled transmission rate constraint, i.e., R θ R < 1, the optimal LRB scheduler strictly outperforms the random scheduler, i.e.,
where L 1 (a * , b * ) and L 2 (R) are given in Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, respectively. Proof: Under a scheduled transmission rate constraint R < 1 and for any pair of a * and b * satisfying (26) and (26), it follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 that
Note that a * + b * = θ 0 + θ 1 and b * > a * , we obtain that
This further implies that
where the inequality follows from the fact that
Example 1: We use Fig. 3 to compare the error exponents (relative entropy) for the two schedulers under different scheduled transmission rate constraints by setting θ 0 = 0, θ 1 = 1, and σ 2 = 1. For the random scheduler, the error exponent grows linearly with respect to the scheduled transmission rate. For the LRB scheduler, however, we observe a faster increase of error exponent when transmission rate is lower than 0.4. It is also noteworthy when only 70% of sensor measurements are sent, the detection performance of the LBR scheduler is only 2.1% worse than the standard N-P test using the full set of measurements. This suggests that the use of the scheduler with the form of (10) is an effective method for maintaining good detection performance under limited scheduled transmission rates.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS UNDER CYBER ATTACKS
Till now, we have considered the problem of networked detection problem via the N-P approach for secure channels. In this section, we study the same problem over nonsecure channels. In particular, a jamming attacker [3] randomly injects extra signals to the channel, which arrive at the tester together with the sensor measurements. Without a scheduler, it is usually impossible for the tester to distinguish the sensor measurement from the jamming signal. By exploring the binary state variable γ i , we can retrieve some sensor measurements to accomplish the detection task. In this section, we first propose a measurement discriminate protocol and then evaluate the error component for detection under different attack intensities.
A. Measurement Discrimination
Recall the LRB scheduler in (10) . If a packet with the message that γ i = 0 arrives, it can be deduced by the tester that y i ∈ (a, b) and no sensor measurements are sent. When the message γ i = 1 arrives, the tester is informed that a true sensor measurement should satisfy that y i ∈ (−∞, a] ∪ [b, ∞). As γ i is binary-valued, and both y i and the jamming signal q i are continuous-valued, the tester can easily distinguish the binary data γ i from its received continuous-valued data y i and q i (if any). Thus, we are able to design the following protocol for the tester to retrieve some sensor measurements and discard the injected jamming signals. , the tester has to discard all the received data since it is impossible to distinguish q i and y i .
By a similar derivation of (13)- (15), we shall reject H 0 in favor of H 1 when the following condition is met:
where δ i is a binary random variable. It is one if the transmitted measurement y i is correctly identified by the tester and δ i = 0 otherwise. It is obvious from (29) that we only need {δ i γ i } and {δ i γ i y i }, both of which are accessible at the tester, to implement the test, and do not impose any assumption on the injected signal. Remark 3: It is noteworthy that δ i is always equal to one if there is no cyber attack. The rejection region in (29) then reverts to (16) .
Indeed, one may wish to extract information when both q i and y i are greater than b or less than a. To exploit it, it requires the distribution of the attack signals q i . Suppose that the attacker always sends q i greater than b and that the system is in state {θ = θ 0 }. If q i > b and y i < a, the test will discard all the received signals as it is unable to identify which signal is from the system. Thus, the test makes decision by only using sensor measurements with y i > b as all the measurements with y i < a are discarded and measurements with a ≤ y i ≤ b are censored. Clearly, the tester will conclude that the system is in the state {(θ = θ 1 )}, which is obviously incorrect. To solve this issue, the distribution of the jamming signals q i is indispensable.
If there is no scheduler in (10), the tester cannot distinguish y i and q i , and thus fails to complete the detection task. From this point of view, the scheduler helps to against jamming attacks. Although the detection system can survive under such attacks, the detection performance degrades differently under different attack intensities.
B. Performance Analysis
Intuitively, the detection performance degrades when jamming signals are injected more frequently. To formalize it, let a binary variable ζ i to denote whether the attacker injects a signal to the channel, e.g., ζ i = 1 means that there is a jamming signal q i in the channel, otherwise ζ i = 0. To quantify the performance, we further assume that the jamming signal {q i } forms an independent sequence. Let the attack probability be p i := Pr{ζ i = 1}, and
There are four major types of jammers: Constant jammer, deceptive jammer, random jammer, and reactive jammer [3] . The constant jammer continually emits a radio signal. The deceptive jammer constantly injects regular packets instead of random bits. A random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming. The reactive jammer is quiet when the channel is idle, and transmits when it senses channel activity. Their effects on the detection can be essentially characterized by p i and
For instance, we may set p i = 1 for constant, deceptive and reactive jammers, and p i < 1 for random jammer. If the deceptive jammer can access the full knowledge of the system and always inject q i ∈ (−∞, a] ∪ [b, ∞). Then, η i = 0 and the tester is unable to complete the detection task. In fact, the ith transmitted sensor measurement will be affected by cyber attacks with probability 1 − η i . We shall use η i to quantify the performance degradation induced by the jammer.
Note that (29) implies that the designed scheduler and tester continues to work under cyber attacks even without the independence assumption on q i . We, however, make this assumption for the sake of analytical tractability in quantifying performance degradation. As in [12] , this assumption is very useful for modeling the adversary to obtain better insights into the nature of the problem.
The useful information accessed by the tester at time N is denoted by w = {w 1 , . . . , w N }, where w i = {γ i , γ i δ i , γ i δ i y i }. Then the pdf of w is given by
Since w i is not an i.i.d. sequence, Stein's lemma is not applicable and generalized to the case of an independent sequence.
Lemma 3: (Extended Stein's lemma) Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be an independent random sequence under the probability measures Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q n over a set X . Consider a binary hypothesis testing problem
where σ i is some positive scalar. Let R n ⊆ X n be a rejection region of the null hypothesis, and the probabilities of Type I and II errors be
The proof follows the essential idea of the classical Stein's lemma in [26] and is given in Appendix B. The following theorem quantifies the influence of cyber attacks on the detection performance.
Theorem 3: Ifη = lim n →∞ 1 n n i=1 η i exists, where η i is defined in (30). The relative entropy of detection under the LRB scheduler in (10) with cyber attacks is given by
where D(P θ 0 (z 1 )||P θ 1 (z 1 )) is defined in (24) . Proof: Recall that w i is an independent random sequence with the pdf given by
where θ ∈ {θ 0 , θ 1 } and δ, γ ∈ {0, 1}. The relative entropy of the two distributions P (i) θ 0 (w) and P (i) θ 1 (w) under the sensor scheduler and the proposed measurement discrimination over nonsecure channels is computed as
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain that
It follows from Lemma 3 that
which completes the proof. By Lemma 1, an optimal LRB scheduler for detection should be designed to maximize the relative entropy from H 0 to H 1 . Clearly, D(P θ 0 (z 1 )||P θ 1 (z 1 )) increases in left threshold a but decreases in right threshold b. However, increasing a will decrease the robustness of the LRB scheduler against cyber attacks, which is obvious by (30) and Theorem 3. Note that the role of the parameter b is similar to the parameter a. Together with Theorem 3, the optimal LRB scheduler for detection under cyber attacks is defined.
Definition 2: Under cyber attacks, the optimal LRB scheduler in (10) for the N-P test is solved via the following constrained optimization:
In view of the definition of η i in (30), solving the above optimization problem requires the distribution of injected signal q i , which however is generally unknown to the design of the LRB scheduler.
Example 2: Note that a typical detection system usually works under system state H 0 : {θ = θ 0 } in the majority of time. A jamming attacker might fabricate a false alarm in the system by injecting signals generated from distribution P θ 1 according to the alternative state H 1 : {θ = θ 1 }, i.e., q i ∼ P θ 1 . Under this case, we provide Fig. 4 to illustrate how the error exponent (relative entropy) in Theorem 3 changes under different attack intensities. Particularly, let θ 0 = 0, θ 1 = 1, and σ 2 = 1 whereas the attack intensity varies from 0.1 to 1.0. The case when no attack happens (i.e., p i = 0) is also depicted for comparison. From Fig. 4 , it is apparent that a higher attack intensity results in a smaller error component, which is certainly consistent with the intuition as more jamming signals will be received by the tester. The LRB scheduler with a lower scheduled transmission rate is more robust to cyber attacks. For example, when the rate is less than 0.3, the error exponents under different attack intensities are close. An instant explanation is that only a small portion of sensor measurements will be influenced by the injected signals.
The advantage of using the LRB scheduler becomes significant for a relatively large attack intensity (p i ≥ 0.5). Without the LRB scheduler, which corresponds to that the scheduled transmission rate is equal to one, the error components do not always attain their maximum at R = 1. To attain the best detection performance (e.g., the maximum error component), we have to resort to an effective LRB scheduler for the case that p i ≥ 0.5.
Under the extreme case (p i = 1.0), the error component even goes to zero as the scheduled transmission rate approaches one. This implies that without the LRB scheduler, the detection task cannot be completed for the high attack intensity. Without an LRB scheduler, every sensor measurement will be corrupted and cannot be distinguished from the jamming signals. Thus, all the sensor measurements will be discarded, leading to the failure of discriminating the system state. This clearly explains the motivation for designing an LRB communication scheduler in the sensor side.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, the theoretical results are validated respectively via simulations. A deterministic signal in Gaussian noise is given by
where θ ∈ R is an unknown parameter for hypothesis testing, and v i is a white Gaussian noise with variance σ 2 = 1. Consider a hypothesis testing problem as follows:
Obviously, the testing problem in this case is a signal detection problem, i.e., detecting the presence or absence of a deterministic signal in Gaussian environment. Accordingly, the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is given by: SNR = 10 log 10 θ
Low observation SNR of −3 dB, medium observation SNR of 0 dB, and high observation SNR of 3 dB are adopted in the numerical test.
A. Detection Performance Without Cyber Attacks
In this section, we check the testing performance of the scheduler based N-P test from the N-P approach, where we fix the probability of Type I error at α = 0.05 and numerically compute the probability of Type II error using the Monte Carlo method. The channel is assumed to be secure, and the rejection condition of the null hypothesis is given by (16) and (18) . Here we take a two-step procedure to complete the simulation.
In the first step, we determine the parameter k to satisfy that the probability of Type I error is controlled to below α = 0.05 under different sizes of sensor measurements, and scheduled transmission rate constraints. Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint R, define
where γ i is given in (10) and Theorem 1. For each N , we independently generated S = 5000 samples from a Gaussian random variable under H 0 . Then, we recursively obtain a data set with size S for each N , i.e.,
using (39), from which an empirical distribution of T N can be obtained, and denoted as F N (·, ω) with ω ∈ Ω. By the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem [28] , the empirical distribution converges almost surely to the true distribution of T N . This means that F N (·, ω) is a good approximation of the true distribution of T N . Then, the corresponding testing parameter k for each N is selected as
In the second step, the parameters determined above are used to compute the probability of Type II error. Similarly, we independently generated S = 5000 samples from a Gaussian random variable under H 1 , and recursively obtain a data set T N with size S for each N . By the N-P test, we count the number of samples that accept H 0 , and the probability of Type II error is approximately given by the ratio of the total number of samples accepting H 0 to S, i.e.,
where #A denotes the cardinality of set A. Fig. 5 illustrates the numerically computed probability of Type II error under a scheduled transmission rate constraint R θ 0.5. It is observed from Fig. 5 that the probability of Type II error under the LRB scheduler comes close to the standard N-P test using the full set of measurements, and they are indistinguishable for a reasonable size of sensor measurements. It is evident that the probability of Type II error of the LRB scheduler is smaller than the random scheduler. This numerically demonstrates the effectiveness of the LRB scheduler, and supports our theoretical results.
B. Detection Performance With Cyber Attacks
In this section, we examine the detection performance of N-P test when jamming signals are injected into the channel. Similar to the previous section, the probability of Type I error is fixed at α = 0.05 and the probability of Type II error is obtained via the two-step Monte Carlo method with a modification on the testing statistic T N as follows:
The injection signals are assumed to be generated from distribution P θ 1 according to the alternative hypothesis H 1 : {θ = θ 1 } to fabricate a false alarm in the system. The SNR is fixed at Fig . 6 depicts the numerically computed probability of Type II error when the system is being affected by cyber attacks. The detection performance under low, medium, and high attack intensities are given by Fig. 6(a) , (b), and (c), respectively. For a certain attack intensity, testing results under different levels of transmission rate constraints, e.g., R ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0} are illustrated in the figure.
It is clear from Fig 6(a) that a higher transmission rate generally results in better detection performance under low attack intensities. For the medium and high attack intensities given in Fig. 6(b) and (c), however, the result is quite different. The best detection performance is obtained at R = 0.5 and R = 0.3 when the system is suffering cyber attacks with intensities p i = 0.5 and p i = 1.0, respectively. When the transmission rate approaches to 1, the testing performance deteriorates significantly. At high attack intensity (p i = 1.0), transmitting 90% sensor measurements does not achieves a comparable performance to the case with merely 10% measurements are transmitted. This scenario can be explained by the fact that a large portion of transmitted measurement are discarded at the tester since true sensor measurements become less and less discriminative among injected signals when transmission rate increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to transmission constraints and possible cyber attacks of a nonsecure network, we have proposed an LRB scheduler for the binary detection problem. The challenge of this testing framework lies in the nonlinearity of the scheduler. Asymptotic analysis results demonstrate that the LRB scheduler for a secure network shares a comparable detection performance to the standard one, which uses the full set of sensor measurements, even under a moderate communication cost. Meanwhile, it achieves a strictly better exponent of Type II probability of error than the random scheduler. Under cyber attacks by injecting jamming signals to the network, the LRB scheduler can also maintain its detection functionality. The degradation of detection performance was exactly quantified by means of asymptotic analysis.
Our future work is to extend the idea of the LRB scheduler to the multiple hypotheses case, i.e., θ ∈ {θ 0 , . . . , θ M −1 } and M > 2. However, this entails a new challenge in selecting informative measurements, and conducting the asymptotic analysis. Another important future research is to study the vector measurement. There are two possible approaches for this generalization. One is to sequentially decide the transmission of each element of the measurement vector. The other is to compress the measurement vector into one dimensional scalar. The proof essentially follows that of Stein's lemma, except using the Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers [27] .
Proof: Construct a sequence of acceptance region A n ⊆ R n such that α n < and β n := 2 −nD n (P 0 ||P 1 ) whereD n (P 0 Thus, no sequence of sets B n has an exponent better than D n (P 0 ||P 1 ). Since the sequence A n achieves the exponent D n (P 0 ||P 1 ), then A n is asymptotically optimal, and the best error exponent isD n (P 0 ||P 1 ) . = 
